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Abstract Wittgenstein’s atomist picture, as embodied in his Tractatus, is initially
very appealing. However, it faces the famous colour-exclusion problem. In this paper,
I shall explain when the atomist picture can be defended (in principle) in the face of
that problem; and, in the light of this, why the atomist picture should be rejected. I
outline the atomist picture in Section 1. In Section 2, I present a very simple neces-
sary and sufficient condition for the tenability (in principle) of the atomist picture.
The condition is: logical space is a power of two. In Sections 3 and 4, I outline the
colour-exclusion problem, and then show how the cardinality-condition supplies a
response to exclusion problems. In Section 5, I explain how this amounts to a distilla-
tion of a proposal due to Moss (2012), which goes back to Carruthers (1990: 144–7).
And in Section 6, I show how all this vindicates Wittgenstein’s ultimate rejection
of the atomist picture. The brief reason is that we have no guarantee that there are
any solutions to a given exclusion problem but, if there are any, then there are far
too many.
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1 Wittgenstein’s Atomist Picture
Wittgenstein’s atomist picture provides us with an extremely elegant, combinatorial
picture of modality. Possibilities are generated by combinations of atomic proposi-
tions, which are in turn generated by combinations of simples. In what follows, I
shall think of the possibilities as points in a logical space. (We can equally call these
possibilities ‘possible words’, and call logical space ‘the possible universe’; nothing
will turn on this terminology).
Here is the atomist picture in more detail. The atomic propositions have a
particular form (Wittgenstein [10]: 2–2.0212, 4.22)
Simples-Recombination. Atomic propositions consist of concatenations of
(names for) simples. Subject only to constraints on their logical types, any
arbitrary recombination of simples yields an atomic proposition.
So: given an atomic proposition, a, replacing the (names for) simples in a with
(names for) other simples of the same logical type yields another atomic proposition.
These atomic propositions then generate the possibilities in logical space, via two
principles ([10]: 4.211, 4.26–4.28, 5.134):
Modal-Valuationism. Each possibility in logical space uniquely corresponds to a
valuation of the atomic propositions. A valuation assigns either truth or falsity
(never both) to each atomic propositions.
Atomic-Independence. The atomic propositions are logically independent from
one another: no assignment of a truth value to any atomic propositions determines
the truth values of any other atomic propositions.
So: any combinatorial possible assignment of truth values to atomic propositions
yields a possibility. These three principles record the atomist picture. And it provides
an elegantly simple of logical space. It would be lovely, if it were true.
2 An Elementary Cardinality-constraint
I have described the atomist picture as combinatorial. In fact, it is intimately con-
nected to an elementary cardinality-constraint. Stated briefly, this constraint is:
logical space is a power of two. I use this phrase, to abbreviate the following claim:
for some cardinal a, the cardinality of logical space is 2a, i.e. there are exactly 2a
possibilities. Note that I shall not insist that a is finite; indeed, transfinite values of a
are probably to be expected.
Our cardinality-constraint is obviously a necessary condition for the tenability of
the atomist picture, i.e.:
If logical space can be described by the atomist picture, then logical space is a
power of two.
I say that this is obvious, because the atomist picture is so closely tied to the idea of
truth tables (Wittgenstein [10]: 4.26–4.31, 4.442, [11]: 170–1; Ramsey [7]: 470), and
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a truth table with a atomic propositions has exactly 2a lines. But it is worth running
through this point in detail, not least to ensure that it holds for ‘infinite’ truth tables
(that is, when a is infinite).
Suppose, then, that logical space can be described by the atomist picture. So we
have some set, A, of atomic propositions. These propositions must each have exactly
one truth value, by Modal-Valuationism, and their truth values are logically inde-
pendent, by Atomic-Independence. So the number of possible complete assignments
of truth/falsity to the atomic propositions is just the number of distinct functions
from A to the set {True, False}. Where A’s cardinality is a, there are exactly 2a such
functions. So, by Modal-Valuationism, there are 2a possibilities, as required.
In fact, this necessary condition is also a sufficient condition on the in-principle
tenability of the atomist picture. That is:
If logical space is a power of two, then logical space can be described by the
atomist picture.
To show this, I shall assume that logical space is a power of two, and use this
assumption to construct a toy model which satisfies the atomist picture.
Suppose, then, that there are 2a possibilities. Let S be any set with cardinality
a, and call S’s members Switches. Every Switch is a simple. There is one further
simple, Flicked. The atomic propositions are now all and only the concatenations of
(the name of) Flicked together with (the name of) any Switch. Call the set of atomic
propositions A. Call each v ∈ (A) a valuation; if a ∈ v, say that v makes a true; if
a /∈ v, say that v makes a false.
It remains to show that this toy model satisfies the atomist picture.
Concerning Simples-Recombination. The atomic propositions consist of any arbi-
trary concatenation of (names of) simples, subject to a constraint on their logical type
which we can think of as follows: Flicked is a one-place property and the Switches
are just first-order objects.1
Concerning Modal-Valuationism. We are treating (A) as the set of all possible
valuations. Clearly both A and S have cardinality a, so that the cardinality of (A) is
2a. Since we assumed that there are also 2a possibilities, there is a bijection between
the set of possibilities and the set of valuations, i.e. every possibility uniquely cor-
responds to a valuation. Moreover, each valuation v ∈ (A) says, of each atomic
proposition in A, either that it is true, or that it is false, but never both.
Concerning Atomic-Independence. We are treating any v ∈ (A) as a valuation,
i.e. an assignment of truth/falsity to the atomic propositions. So any combinatorially
independent assignment of truth/falsity to the atomic propositions is legitimate.
1This follows Potter ([6]:232–3), who holds that Tractarian simples can be universals (see also Canfield
[2]). This view has been controversial among Tractatus scholars; for example, Carruthers ([3]: 6–8, 137)
explicitly rejects it. So, Carruthers would have to regard the atomic propositions, in this analysis, simply
as the individual names for Switches (and nothing else). However, Carruthers is also a little hesitant about
thinking that propositions might consist of just a single name. So Carruthers might deny that this kind of
analysis is admissible. Nonetheless, in the cases which will matter most—where a is infinite—there will
be an abundance of toy analyses which would satisfy Carruthers; see Section 6.
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As such, our toy model satisfies all three principles of Wittgenstein’s atomist
picture, thereby establishing the sufficient condition. So we now obtain an elemen-
tary necessary and sufficient condition for the in-principle tenability of the atomist
picture:
Logical space can be described by the atomist picture iff logical space is a power
of two.
3 Exclusion Problems
I have set out the atomist picture, and shown how its combinatorial nature nat-
urally leads to an elementary cardinality-constraint. I now want to outline the
famous colour-exclusion problem. This was raised against Atomic-Independence by
Wittgenstein himself ([10]: 6.3751, [11, 13]: 67–8).
Apparently,2 the proposition thatO is red and the proposition thatO is blue cannot
both be true together: different colours exclude one another. So, if atomic propo-
sitions are logically independent from one another, as Atomic-Independence states,
then colour-ascriptions cannot be atomic propositions. But colour-ascriptions seem
like excellent candidates for atomic propositions. The example gives the problem its
name, the colour-exclusion problem.
It is worth emphasising that colour-exclusion is just one example of an exclusion
problem. Other examples are legion. No region can have multiple different tempera-
tures; no object can have multiple different locations, masses, volumes or velocities;
and so forth ([10]: 6.3751). More generally, exclusion arises whenever a property can
come by degree ([11, 12] VIII.91). Indeed, one might well say that exclusions are not
the exception but the ‘rule’ ([13]: 64).
Faced with these exclusion problems, Wittgenstein ultimately abandoned Atomic-
Independence ([10]: 167–9, [11]: VIII.78–84, [12]: 63–4, 74–6). I shall argue that
he was right to do so, and for reasons which are intimately connected with the ele-
mentary cardinality-constraint outlined in Section 2. Crudely stated, the cardinality-
constraint allows for a ‘cheap response’ to exclusion problems, whose cheapness
undercuts the atomist picture.
2Pun intended. I suspect that colour-exclusion is not a matter of necessity (whether logical, grammatical,
or conceptual). Roughly put: I suspect it is merely a biological fact that we do not see colours like we hear
musical chords.
Such suspicions need not just result from abstract thought-experiments; we can actually get some con-
crete sense of what seeing a red-blue colour-chord might be like. Just place two identically sized rectangles,
one red and one blue, besides each other, and then go cross-eye, so that your visual images of the two rect-
angles overlap completely. (This simple approach is described in [1] which also describes a much more
controlled experiment.) If an object could look like that through just one eye, why not say it is both red
and blue? Or, if you prefer to ascribe colours to patches in the visual field, rather than objects, why not say
that patch is both red and blue?
Wittgenstein himself largely describes colour exclusion as necessary ([10]: 6.3751, [11]: 167, [12]:
IV.39, VIII.77–78, [13]: 67, 78, 241). However, there is a glimmer of the alternative, in his response ([13]:
79) to Waismann’s suggestion that psychologists might empirically investigate colour-exclusion.
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4 A Cheap Response to Exclusion Problems
To illustrate the ‘cheap response’, I shall focus on a particular exclusion problem
generated by a toy logical space.
Heat Space. Our toy logical space consists of the possible assignments of tem-
perature properties to the points of spacetime. We can think of the points of
spacetime as quadruples of real numbers (describing points relative to some coor-
dinate system), and we can think of the temperatures as non-negative real numbers
(describing temperature in Kelvins). Any assignment of temperature properties to
points of spacetime is possible, subject to two constraints:
(a) Each spacetime point has exactly one temperature property.
(b) The distribution of temperature properties must be continuous.
Whilst still a toy, Heat Space gives rise to an exclusion problem which is a little more
interesting than usual. On a minor level: rather than considering (colour-)exclusion
for a single object, it considers (temperature-)exclusion for continuum-many objects
(the spacetime points) simultaneously.3 Much more interestingly: two kinds of exclu-
sion operate in Heat Space. Constraint (b) gives us temperature-exclusion at each
point: nothing can be both 17K and 18K at the same time. But constraint (b) gives
us temperature-exclusion across points: whilst you can consistently assign any tem-
peratures to any two points, certain patterns of temperature distribution are ruled out;
for example, there cannot be any abrupt local heat spikes. So, Heat Space is certainly
a toy, but the restrictions it imposes are not wholly trivial.
Let us now see how the cardinality-considerations of Section 2 apply to Heat
Space.
Given the description of Heat Space, the number of possibilities is precisely the
number of continuous functions from R4 to [0,∞). In effect, (b) tells us to con-
sider functions, and (b) tells us that they must be continuous. A little mathematics
will convince us that there are exactly 2ℵ0 such functions.4 So, by the cardinality-
considerations of Section 2, we know that Heat Space can, in principle, be described
using the atomist picture. Indeed, we can build a toy model which seems to describe
Heat Space, by insisting that there are ℵ0 atomic propositions which decompose,
under logical analysis, into ℵ0 distinct Switches, each concatenated with Flicked.
Call this the Flicked-Switch Analysis of Heat Space.
This is a very ‘cheap response’, in that it brushes aside Heat Space’s exclusion
problem(s) with a mere gesture at our elementary cardinality-constraint. But, given
the availability of this cheap response, we are forced to ask why anyone has ever even
thought that exclusion problems raises serious problems for the atomist picture.
Two obvious answers present themselves. First, unlike our toy Heat Space, logical
space itself might not be a power of two. In that case, the cardinality-considerations
3On this point, compare Carruthers’s ([3]: 144–7) model.
4Let C be the set of continuous functions from R4 to [0,∞). Constant functions are continuous; so |C| ≥
2ℵ0 . Conversely, if f, g ∈ C and f (p) = g(p) for all p ∈ Q4, then f = g, since f and g are continuous;
but the total number of functions from Q4 to [0,∞) is (2ℵ0 )ℵ0 = 2ℵ0 ; so |C| ≤ 2ℵ0 .
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of Section 2 would show that the atomist picture is in principle untenable. Second,
the Flicked-Switch Analysis, just offered, might simply feel too cheap. As I shall
explain in Section 6, both answers are basically correct. Moreover, this explains why
we should reject the atomist picture.
5 Moss’s Approach
First, though, I must embark on a slight detour, and consider Moss’s [5] recent claim
to have solved the colour-exclusion problem. I want to show that Moss’s solution ulti-
mately boils down to the ‘cheap response’ which I just offered, so that the problems
concerning the ‘cheap response’ are also problems for Moss. But I should add that it
is no coincidence that Moss’s solution boils down to mine; my paper was prompted
by trying to isolate the moving parts of Moss’s paper.
5.1 Moss’s Solution
The core of Moss’s response to colour exclusion is the following argument:5
(1) ‘given an arbitrary set S of propositions, we can always find 2a (for some a)
mutually exclusive propositions such that any member of S is a conjunction of
some of them.’ ([5]: 846)
(2) ‘for any 2a mutually exclusive propositions, we can find a logically inde-
pendent propositions such that the mutually exclusive propositions are truth-
functional combinations of them.’ ([5]: 845)
So: given an arbitrary set S of propositions, we can find logically independent
propositions such that the propositions in S are truth-functional combinations
of the logically independent propositions.
The conclusion of this argument amounts to a statement that the atomist picture
is tenable in principle. In that sense, it invites comparison with my elementary
cardinality-constraint from Section 2. However, I should deal with one immediate
difference. In Section 2, I reasoned about logical space; Moss, by contrast, discusses
(sets of) propositions. This difference, however, is shallower than it might seem, since
Moss ‘take[s] propositions to be sets of possible worlds’ ([5]: 842). As mentioned in
Section 1, nothing turns on calling the possibilities ‘possible worlds’. So, in my ter-
minology, Moss’s propositions are just regions (rather than points) of logical space.
As such, our considerations are commensurable.
I shall revisit this point below. First, I shall consider how Moss defends the
premises of her argument. To establish (1), Moss defines a relation on the possible
worlds as follows:
wRx iff p is true at w iff p is true at x, for all p ∈ S
5I have compressed the argument, and numbered the steps. Additionally, in these quotes, and in subsequent
quotes from Moss throughout this section, I have silently (but harmlessly) changed several minor points
of notation.
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She then defines a set, S∗, as ‘the set of equivalence classes of worlds under’ R ([5]:
846). Her argument for (1) now proceeds by cases:
(1a) The cardinality of S∗ is 2a, for some a. In this case, ‘we are done’. After all,
S∗ is a set of sets of worlds, and hence (for Moss) a set of propositions, which
itself has the required properties.
(1b) The cardinality of S∗ is not 2a, for any a. In this case, we should ‘repeat-
edly replace any single member of S∗ with mutually exclusive propositions
whose disjunction [i.e. union] is that member. In this way, we can increase
the cardinality of S∗ until it contains 2a mutually exclusive propositions.’ ([5]:
846)
Below, I shall discuss the assumption which is required to license this ‘replacing’ in
(1b). (Spoiler alert: it is that logical space be a power of two.) But we shall take (1)
as established for now.
In defence of (2), Moss works through a particular example, namely, the fact that
an object, O, can only have one of continuum-many colours. She observes that, just
as there are continuum-many colours, so there are ‘continuum-many infinitely long
sequences of 0’s and 1’s.’ So Moss ‘fix[es] a bijection between these sets, a mapping
from possible colors of O to infinite binary strings.’ Call this bijection f . Then Moss
asks us to consider, for each natural number i, the proposition:6
Fi : that f maps O’s colour to a string with a 1 in the ith place
These propositions are logically independent from one another. Moreover, for each
subset, C, of the natural numbers, the infinite conjunction
∧
i∈C Fi ∧
∧
i /∈C ¬Fi pins
down a unique colour for O. So ‘each ordinary language color proposition [concern-
ing O] is a truth-functional combination of the Fi propositions’ ([5]: 845). Moss
then generalises from this observation, to arrive at (2), by noting that the case of O’s
colour was just an illustrative example in which a = ℵ0.
This completes my summary of Moss’s argument. In the remainder of this
section, I shall try to show that the key take-away from Moss’s solution is pre-
cisely the cardinality-constraint of Section 2, with its concomitant ‘cheap response’
to exclusion problems.
5.2 On Ordinary Language
I shall start by revisiting the difference I raised at the start of this section, concerning
Moss’s focus on propositions. She does this, because she wants to deliver on the
claim that ‘we can completely analyze all ordinary language propositions’ ([5]: 841).
In this regard, my approach diverges from hers, since I did not mention ‘ordinary
language’ anywhere in Sections 1–3. This difference, however, is rather superficial.
Moss’s approach certainly seems to be quite tightly connected with ordinary lan-
guage. Indeed, in defending (2), Moss may seem to have defined each Fi within
6This fixes (what I take to be) a small typesetting error in Moss’s paper. I have also incorporated the
bijection f explicitly into the (statement of) each proposition; this is both strictly-speaking necessary and
more than mere pedantry (see below).
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ordinary language. But appearances here are misleading. In defining each Fi , Moss
appealed to a bijection, f . But she did not explicitly specify f . Instead, she ‘fixed’
it, as the mathematicians say. And she is forced to ‘fix’ it, for English contains no
names for particular maps from colours to infinite binary strings, nor the means for
defining any explicitly. Otherwise put: we know that the Fis exist, but we have no
means to express them in ordinary language.
The separation between ordinary language and Moss’s solution grows deeper
when we consider Moss’s discussion of case (1b). We may well want to ‘repeatedly
replace any single member of S∗ with mutually exclusive propositions whose dis-
junction is that member’. But there is no guarantee that ordinary language provides us
with the words for such mutually exclusive propositions. Again: there is no guaran-
tee that ordinary language allows us to express the atomic propositions which Moss
ends up with.
Indeed, the only real bridge whichMoss builds to ‘ordinary language propositions’
is in her decision to ‘take propositions to be sets of worlds’ ([5]: 842). But this just
returns me to the point I made at the start of the section. Nothing prevents me from
taking propositions—ordinary language, or otherwise—to be sets of possibilities, i.e.
regions of logical space.7
In sum: despite initial appearances, Moss’s approach gives us no closer relation-
ship to ordinary language than my own.
5.3 On Arbitrary Propositions
There remains a difference, in that Moss allows us to start with arbitrary sets
of propositions—i.e. sets of regions of logical space—whereas I leap straight into
logical space itself.
In fact, starting with arbitrary sets of propositions can lead to oddities. Let p be
the proposition that the present King of France is bald, and let S = {p}. Following
Moss’s argument for (1), we form S∗ from S. This partitions the possible universe
into two sets: the set of worlds where p is true, and the set of worlds where p is false.
Since the cardinality of S∗ is 2, we are in case (1a), and ‘we are done’. We now apply
(2) to S∗, and so find exactly one (logically independent!) proposition such that the
propositions in S∗ are truth-functional combinations of it. Plainly, that proposition is
p itself. And this encourages us to think of p as an atomic proposition. But, of course,
p is not atomic.
To get closer to the genuinely atomic propositions, we must start with a richer
set than {p}. There is no better set in this regard than the set of all propositions.
Call this set P and, as before, form P ∗ from P . Following Moss, we now reason by
cases. In case (1a), there are 2a propositions in P ∗, for some a, and ‘we are done’.
But in case (1b) we run into trouble.8 We are supposed to ‘repeatedly replace any
single member of P ∗ with mutually exclusive propositions whose disjunction is that
7Indeed, this is quite Tractarian; (see [10]: 4.4–4.431). On this picture, if there are a atomic propositions,
then there are 2(2
a) propositions, i.e. 2(2
a) sets of possible worlds.
8My argument in this paragraph assumes—as Moss surely does—that worlds are identical iff exactly the
same propositions are true in them.
Exclusion Problems and the Cardinality of Logical Space
member’. Unfortunately, we cannot do this. By assumption, P was the set of all
propositions, so that P ∗ is the finest equivalence class on the possible universe. In
short, for Moss’s approach to work, she must simply assume that case (1b) cannot
arise here. Otherwise put: she must assume that the cardinality of P ∗ is 2a for some
a. Since a moment’s reflection will convince us that P ∗ is the set of all singletons of
possible worlds, we can restate the point again as follows: to defend (1), Moss must
assume that logical space is a power of two.
Now, for reasons in precisely this ballpark, Moss herself suggests that we should
assume that ‘the number of worlds is a power of 2’. This is all to the good. However,
she describes this as a ‘weak assumption’ which ‘suffices’ for her defence of the
atomist picture ([5]: 846, 847). Here, I demure. The point of Section 2 is that this
supposedly ‘weak assumption’ is not merely sufficient for the in-principle-tenability
of the atomist picture, but also necessary for it. (Moreover, since the assumption is
logically equivalent to the in-principle-tenability of the atomist picture, we might
well question whether it really is ‘weak’; I return to this in Section 6.)
The main point of all this is as follows. Allowing arbitrary sets of propositions
leads to odd verdicts concerning the atomic propositions. And, when we strip matters
back to the key case—the set of all propositions—the only point to extract is the
simple fact that logical space can be described by the atomist picture if and only if
logical space is a power of two. That, of course, was the point of Section 2.
5.4 On Colours, Functions, and Strings
The final point I want to emphasise is that Moss’s approach does not give us any clue
about the correct logical analysis of the atomic propositions.9
There are some obvious similarities between my considerations in Section 2 and
Moss’s discussion of O’s colour.10 Indeed, Moss’s Fis are quite similar to the atomic
propositions I provided in my Flicked-Switch Analysis of Heat Space. Just think of
the ℵ0 Switches as arranged in an ω-sequence, and write a ‘1’ beneath a flicked
switch and a ‘0’ beneath a non-flicked switch.
However, I want to emphasise that Moss’s Fis do not provide us with a good
logical analysis of the propositions involved in colour-exclusion. In a sense this is
obvious: herFis were given whilst considering a toy example which arose just by con-
sidering the set of propositions stating O’s possible colours. But the point I want to
make is rather more general, namely: atomic propositions cannot consist of anything
like (names for) colours and functions and strings.11 We can see this in two ways.
First Argument. Moss used the map f from colours to strings. Let us consider a
different map, g, as follows: where f maps the colour c to the string s, let g map c
to s’s ‘binary opposite’, i.e. to the string which has a 1 wherever s has a 0 and vice
versa. Using g, we then consider, for each natural number i, the proposition:
9But nor does my own, as we shall see in Section 6.
10And also with Carruthers ([3]: 144–7).
11Moss ([5]: 848–50) discusses a related but different problem, namely, that the propositions she generates
via (1) will likely contain apparent names for logical constants, such as ‘or’. Her response to that problem,
in brief, is that simplicity is relative to a language. This does not affect my point.
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Gi : that g maps O’s colour to a string with a 1 in the ith place
The Gis are as logically independent from each other as were the Fis. However, there
are dependencies between the Fis and the Gis: since f and g map the same colour
to ‘opposite’ strings, exactly one of Fi and Gi is true (for each i), regardless of O’s
colour. This is, of course, just another exclusion problem. But no exclusion problems
can remain in the final analysis.
Second Argument.12 Let us assume that colours are simple.13 Nevertheless, a term
of the form ‘f (c)’—which is supposed to pick out the string which f sends c to—
is obviously complex. So, by Simples-Recombination, ‘f (c)’ cannot appear in an
atomic proposition. A good Tractarian must therefore replace the occurrence of the
map f , in each Fi , with some propositional function. But, since we are assuming that
the colours are simples, it follows from Simples-Recombination (again) that there is
some world, w, where all the colours satisfy exactly the same propositional functions
as each other. Accordingly, inw, every colour is ‘mapped’ to the same string. As such,
we cannot regard O’s colour in w as a truth-functional combination of the Fis.14
The upshot of both arguments is that the atomic propositions cannot consist of
anything like (names for) colours and functions and strings. Once we have appreci-
ated this point, though, we see that Moss’s discussion of colours and functions and
strings is just a vivid illustration of her point (2), which provides us with no guide
at all to the logical form of the atomic propositions. The key point to extract—once
again—is just an observation about cardinality.
6 Abandoning Atomic-Independence
Returning from my discussion of Moss, here is the story of the paper so far.
We saw in Section 2 that the in-principle-tenability of the atomist picture reduces
to an elementary cardinality-constraint. Moreover, this provides us with a ‘cheap
response’ to exclusion problems, as I showed by applying the cardinality-constraint
of Section 2 to Heat Space in Section 4. The upshot was a particular toy analysis—the
Flicked-Switch Analysis—where ℵ0 atomic propositions generate the 2ℵ0 possible
temperature distributions in Heat Space. To close the paper, I want to explain how
unsatisfying the Flicked-Switch Analysis is, and thereby to vindicate Wittgenstein’s
rejection of Atomic-Independence.
In the Flicked-Switch Analysis of Heat Space, we have a bijection between config-
urations of Switches (flicked or not) and the possibilities in Heat Space. So, we know
that if you change whether a particular switch is flicked or not, you change the way
in which temperatures are assigned to points. But there is no a priori constraint on
how these changes occur. Starting from some given possibility: by ‘toggling’ Switch
1, everything which was hot might become cold; by then ‘toggling’ Switch 2, an
12Thanks to Rob Trueman for this observation; for related discussion, see Trueman [8]: 296.
13See Canfield [2].
14And of course the same issue arises for binary strings, since strings are functions from the natural
numbers to 0 and 1.
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unmeasurable collection of points might become freezing; and by ‘toggling’ Switch
1 again, the world may turn uniformly balmly. Or not. The relationship between the
states of the Switches, on the one hand, and the temperatures at each point, on the
other, is entirely opaque.15
This is one reason to be dissatisfied with the Flicked-Switch Analysis. A second
reason is that genuinely alternative logical analyses are available. We showed that
Heat Space comprises 2ℵ0 possibilities. It follows that, if the atomist picture is to
be applied to Heat Space, there must be ℵ0 atomic propositions. However, there is
no reason to think that they must decompose, under logical analysis, into Flicked
Switches. Instead, the atomic propositions might decompose according to the follow-
ing Yin-Yang Analysis: there are ℵ0 Yins and ℵ0 Yangs, and the atomic propositions
are all and only the concatenations of (the name of) any Yin with (the name of) any
Yang.
The Yin-Yang Analysis is consistent with the atomist picture. To show that it satis-
fies Simples-Recombination, we just need to specify that the Yins and the Yangs are
simples of different logical types. Indeed, we can regard the Yins as first-order objects
and the Yangs as one-place properties, or vice versa (cf. Ramsey [8]). Moreover,
since ℵ0 · ℵ0 = ℵ0, the Yin-Yang Analysis also yields ℵ0 atomic propositions. But
the Yin-Yang and the Flicked-Switch analyses are genuinely different. According to
the Flicked-Switch Analysis, every Switch occurs in exactly one atomic proposition,
and the property Flicked occurs in every atomic proposition. By contrast, according
to the Yin-Yang Analysis, each Yin and each Yang both occur in, and are absent from,
exactly ℵ0 atomic propositions. (And inevitably, just as we had no idea how flicking
Switches will affect the temperature assignment, so we have no idea how coupling or
decoupling Yins and Yangs affects temperatures.)
We need not stop at the Yin-Yang Analysis: any way to generate ℵ0 atomic propo-
sitions from simples will provide us with a toy analysis of Heat Space. For example,
we can turn the Yin-Yang Analysis into the Aristophanean Analysis, by treating the
atomic propositions as arbitrary concatenations of any (distinct) Yins and Yangs.
Alternatively, here is a schema for generating infinitely many rival analysis: let there
be ℵ0 different kinds of simples; let there be ℵ0 instances of each kind; and let the
atomic propositions be all and only the concatenations of names for n distinct entities
drawn from exactly m different kinds (with 0 < m ≤ n < ω).
I could keep going, but the examples given already suffice to raise a pressing ques-
tion: What is the correct logical analysis of Heat Space, and how does that analysis
relate to temperature distributions?
There seems to be no a priori way to answer the pressing question. Nothing
more is given, a priori, by the specification of Heat Space and the desire to apply
the atomist picture to it, than that there must be ℵ0 atomic propositions. This both
underdetermines the logical form of the atomic propositions, and tells us nothing
about their relationship to temperature distributions. In principle, perhaps, maybe,
some further a priori constraint could be deployed, which provides us with more
information. But I, for one, just cannot see what it would look like.
15This is connected with the point, above, that Moss simply ‘fixed’ some bijection, f .
T. Button
Equally, there seems to be no a posteriori way to answer the pressing ques-
tion.16 To have an a posteriori route to the correct analysis of logical space, physics,
or ordinary language, would have to be pushing towards a language within which
exclusion problems did not arise. Unfortunately, as Wittgenstein himself noted, we
seem unavoidably to use numbers (or other devices of gradation) in representing
propositions, and there are exclusion problems whenever there are gradations ([11]:
165–7).
So we seem unable to answer the pressing question. And this point generalises
beyond the toy example of Heat Space, to logical space itself. Proponents of the
atomist picture seem forced to accept that we can neither determine the correct anal-
ysis of the atomic propositions, nor say in any detail how their constituents relate
to the ‘manifest’ possibilities. Consequently, proponents of the atomist picture seem
forced to embrace Ramsey’s ([8]: 417) conclusion ‘that we know and can know noth-
ing whatever about the forms of atomic propositions’. But, as Wittgenstein ([13]:
182–4) himself came to stress: it is one thing to think that we do not know the forms
of atomic propositions; it is vastly less palatable to suggest that we cannot know
anything about them.17
To ice the unpalatable cake, there remains the fact that the atomist picture demands
that logical space be a power of two. If we are not already committed to the cor-
rectness of the atomist picture, why on earth would we have any beliefs about the
cardinality of logical space? A priori reasons here seem thin on the ground. A pos-
teriori evidence might just about be available, since a scientific theory might predict
that logical space is a power of two—consider again the case of Heat Space—but
there is no real reason to be optimistic on that front.
All told, then, Atomic-Independence comes across as a dogma with unpalatable
consequences. Ultimately, the issue is not that we can find no solution to the exclu-
sion problem. The issue is rather as follows: we have no guarantee that there is a
solution to the exclusion problem; but if there are any, then there are too many.18
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